I. CORRELATIONS WITHOUT CORRELATA?
Following Mermin's recent example, 1 I propose to add another specimen to the quantum cabinet of curious interpretations. Mermin chose to call his specimen the Ithaca interpretation of quantum mechanics (IIQM). By the same naming scheme, what is presented in this article is the Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics (PIQM). Mermin tries to remove the mystery from quantum mechanics in just ten words: "Correlations have physical reality; that which they correlate, does not." He does not claim that there are no correlata, only that they are not part of physical reality. They belong to a larger reality which includes consciousness. According to the IIQM, the measurement problem arises in this larger reality, and it arises only when consciousness gets into the story. Being a puzzle about consciousness, it is not a proper subject for a physical theory.
I fully agree with Mermin that "conscious perception... should be viewed as a mystery about us and should not be confused with the problem of understanding quantum mechanics." However, as I see it, the problem of understanding quantum mechanics either is the measurement problem or concerns the presuppositions that give rise to the measurement problem. It seems to me that in declaring the measurement problem to be a puzzle about consciousness, Mermin does precisely what he warns us against: he confuses the problem of consciousness with the problem of understanding quantum mechanics. The measurement problem ought to be solved, or shown to be a pseudoproblem, without dragging in conscious observers.
Quantum mechanics is, if nothing else, a tool for calculating probabilities. Mermin rightly insists that these probabilities are objective, in the sense that they have nothing to do with ignorance -there is nothing for us to be ignorant of. I agree with him that all the mysteries It is tempting to attribute the truth of objective probability assignments to an underlying actual state of affairs. It is equally tempting to assume that this actual state of affairs is somehow represented by the state vector. On this view, the singlet state |0 ∝ | ↑↓ + | ↓↑ not only serves to assign probabilities but also represents an actual state of affairs that accounts for the probabilities. Yet if there were such an actual state of affairs, it would not be described by |0 . All that the singlet state describes is probability distributions. The idea that a tool for assigning probabilities to possibilities describes an actual state of affairs is a category mistake. Moreover, if there were an underlying state of affairs, we would have to ask when and for how long it obtains, and it is well known that to this question there is no covariant answer.
2 Apart from this, if at any time after the "preparation" of the singlet state a matter of fact about a component of either of the two spins is created, 3 the probabilities assigned by the singlet state |0 are not objective, and the objective probabilities associated with the spin components are not given by |0 . The reason this is so is that probabilities can be objective only if they are based on a complete set of facts. Otherwise they are subjective: they reflect our ignorance of some of the relevant facts. Born probabilities are in general calculated on the basis of an incomplete set of facts; they take into account the relevant past matters of fact but ignore the relevant future matters of fact. (By "Born probabilities" I mean the probabilities associated with the standard formulation of standard quantum mechanics. Readers may refer to the appended Glossary for definitions of technical terms.) Born probabilities are objective only if there are no relevant future matters of fact.
ABL probabilities, on the other hand, also take into account the relevant future matters of fact. Named after Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, 4 ABL probabilities are calculated using a non-standard formulation of standard quantum theory known as time-symmetrized quantum theory. [5] [6] [7] This time-symmetric formulation takes due account of the fact that the maximally specified state of a system contains information based not only on initial but also on final measurements. (If a measurement of the x component of the spin of an electron, performed at t i , yields ↑ x , and a measurement of the y component of the spin of the same electron, performed at t f > t i , yields ↑ y , then a measurement of the x component would with certainty have yielded ↑ x if it had been performed at an intermediate time t m , and a measurement of the y component would with certainty have yielded ↑ y if it had been performed at t m . 8 )
Born probabilities can be measured (as relative frequencies) using preselected ensembles (that is, ensembles of identically "prepared" systems). ABL probabilities can be measured using pre-and postselected ensembles (that is, ensembles of systems that are both identically "prepared" and identically "retropared"). Both types of probability are assigned to the possible results of possible measurements. If one of these measurements is actually performed, even the ABL probabilities are calculated on the basis of an incomplete set of facts: they take into account all revelant matters of fact except the result of the actually performed measurement. ABL probabilities are based on a complete set of facts, and therefore objective, if and only if none of the measurements to the possible results of which they are assigned, is actually performed (that is, if between the "preparation" or pre-selection and the "retroparation" or post-selection no measurement is performed).
Thus probabilities are objective only if they are distributed over alternative properties or values none of which are actually possessed, and only if they are based on all relevant matters of fact, including those yet to be created.
II. TIME AND CAUSALITY
If the objective probabilities associated with contrary-to-fact conditionals depend on events that haven't yet happened or states of affairs that are yet to obtain, some kind of retroactive causality appears to be at work. This necessitates a few remarks concerning causality and the apparent "flow" of time. But first let us note that nothing entails the existence of time-reversed causal connections between actual events and/or states of affairs. If at t m the y component of the electron's spin is actually measured (and the results at t i and t f are as specified above), nothing compels us to take the view that ↑ y was found at t m because the same result was obtained at t f . We can certainly stick to the idea that causes precede their effects, according to which ↑ y was found at t f because the same result was obtained at t m . The point, however, is that nothing in the physics prevents us from taking the opposite view. The distinction we make between causes and effects is based on the apparent motion of our location in timethe present moment -toward the future. This special location and its apparent motion are as extraneous to physics as are our location and motion in space. Equally extraneous, therefore, is the distinction between causes and effects. Physics deals with correlations between actual events or states of affairs, classical physics with deterministic correlations, quantum physics with statistical ones. Classical physics allows us to explain the deterministic correlations (abstracted from what appear to be universal regularities) in terms of causal links between individual events. And for some reason to be explained presently, we identify the earlier of two diachronically correlated events as the cause and the later as the effect. The time symmetry of the classical laws of motion, however, makes it equally possible to take the opposite view that the later event is the cause and the earlier event the effect. In a deterministic world, the state of affairs at any time t determines the state of affairs at any other time t ′ , irrespective of the temporal order of t and t ′ . The belief in a time-asymmetric physical causality is an animistic projection of the perspective of a conscious agent into the inanimate world, as I proceed to show. I conceive of myself as a causal agent with a certain freedom of choice. But I cannot conceive of my choice as exerting a causal influence on anything that I knew, or could have known, at the time t c of my choice. I can conceive of my choice as causally determining only such events or states of affairs as are unknowable to me at t c . On a simplistic account, what I knew or could have known at t c is everything that happened before t c . And what is unknowable to me at t c is everything that will happen thereafter. This is the reason why we tend to believe that we can causally influence the future but not the past. And this constraint on our (real or imagined) causal efficacy is what we impose, without justification, both on the deterministic world of classical physics and on the indeterministic world of quantum physics.
When I decide on how exactly I should kick a football in order to score a goal, I use my knowledge of the time-symmetric law that governs the ball's trajectory. 10 I think of the kick as the cause and of the goal scored as its (hoped-for) effect. This time-asymmetric causal relation has nothing to do with the time-symmetric physics I exploit in order to produce the desired effect. It has everything to do with my self-perception as an agent and my successive experience of the world. My asymmetric agent causality rides piggyback on the symmetric determinisms of the physical world, and in general it rides into the future because in general the future is what is unknowable to me. But it may also ride into the past. Three factors account for this possibility. First, as I said, the underlying physics is time-symmetric. If we ignore the strange case of the neutral kaon (which doesn't appear to be relevant to the interpretation of quantum mechanics), this is as true of quantum physics as it is of classical physics. If the standard formulation of quantum physics is asymmetric with respect to time, it is because we think (again without justification) that a measurement does more than yield a particular result. We tend to think that it also prepares a state of affairs which evolves toward the future. However, if this is a consistent way of thinking -it is not 11 -then it is equally consistent to think that a measurement "retropares" a state of affairs that evolves toward the past, as Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz 4 have shown.
Second, what matters is what can be known. If I could know the future, I could not conceive of it as causally dependent on my present choice. In fact, if I could (in principle) know both the past and the future, I could not conceive of myself as an agent. I can conceive of my choice as causally determining the future precisely because I cannot know the future. This has nothing to do with the truism that the future does not (yet) exist. Even if the future in some way "already" exists, it can in part be determined by my present choice, provided I cannot know it at the time of my choice. By the same token, a past state of affairs can be determined by my present choice, provided I cannot know it before the choice is made.
There are two possible reasons why a state of affairs F cannot be known to me at a given time t: (i) F may obtain only after t; (ii) at t there may as yet exist no matter of fact from which F can be inferred. This takes us to the last of the three factors which account for the possibility of retrocausation: the contingent properties of physical systems are extrinsic. By a contingent property of a system S I mean a property that may or may not be possessed by S at a given time. For example, being inside a given region of space and having a spin component of +h/2 along a given axis are contingent properties of electrons. By an extrinsic property of S I mean a property that is undefined, and hence non-attributable, unless its being possessed by S can be inferred from what happens or is the case in the "rest of the world" W − S. A contingent property that is not extrinsic is intrinsic. A contingent property p of S is intrinsic if and only if the proposition p = "S is p" is "of itself" (that is, unconditionally) either true or false at any time; neither the truth nor the meaning of p depends on the goings-on in W − S.
Properties that can be retrocausally determined by the choice of an experimenter, cannot be intrinsic. If p is an extrinsic property of S, the respective criteria for the truth and the falsity of p are to be sought in W − S, and it is possible that neither criterion is satisfied, in which case p is neither true nor false but meaningless. It is also possible that each criterion consists in an event that may occur only after the time to which p refers. If this event is (partly) determined by an experimenter's choice, retrocausation is at work. On the other hand, if p is an intrinsic property of S, p is either true or false independently of what happens in W − S, so a fortiori it is either true or false independently of what happens there after the time t to which p refers. There is then no reason why the truth value of p should be unknowable until This experiment enables the experimenters to choose between (i) measuring the phase relation with which a given atom emerges coherently from two slits and (ii) determining the particular slit from which the atom emerges. They can exert this choice after the atom has emerged from the slit plate and even after it has hit the screen. By choosing to create a matter of fact about the slit taken by the atom, they retroactively cause the atom to have passed through a particular slit. By choosing instead to create a matter of fact about the atom's phase relation, they retroactively cause the atom to have emerged with a definite phase relation. The retrocausal efficacy of their choice rests on the three factors listed above (in different order): (i) The four propositions a 1 = "the atom went through the first slit," a 2 = "the atom went through the second slit," a + = "the atom emerged from the slits in phase," and a − = "the atom emerged from the slits out of phase" affirm extrinsic properties.
(ii) There exist time-symmetric correlations between the atom's possible properties at the time of its passing the slit plate and the possible results of two incompatible (or mutually exclusive) experiments that can be performed at a later time. (iii) The result of the actually performed experiment is the first (earliest) matter of fact about either the particular slit taken by the atom or the phase relation with which the atom emerged from the slits. Before they made their choice, the experimenters could not possibly have known the slit from which, or the phase relation with which, the atom emerged. Probabilities, I said, can be objective only if they are based on all relevant matters of fact, including those yet to be created. We now see more clearly why it should be so. Our distinction between the past, the present, and the future, as Mermin likewise observes, 14 has nothing to do with physics. Physics "knows nothing of now," so it cannot know anything of the difference between the past and the future. An objective physical probability therefore cannot depend on a selection of facts that is based on this difference.
III. THE CONTINGENT REALITY OF SPATIAL DISTINCTIONS
The extrinsic nature of the contingent properties of physical systems is implied by the existence of objective probabilities. Objective probabilities, recall, are assigned to alternative properties none of which are actually possessed. Take the counterfactual "If there were a matter of fact about the slit taken by the atom, the atom would have taken the first slit." We can assign to this counterfactual an objective probability (other than 0 or 1) only if the proposition "The atom went through the first slit" is neither true nor false but meaningless. The reason why this proposition can be meaningless is that the atom's whereabouts are extrinsic. The proposition is meaningless just in case there isn't any matter of fact about the slit taken by the atom.
Thus, according to the PIQM, the positions of things (like all contingent properties) are extrinsic. And since " [t] here is nothing in quantum theory making it applicable to three atoms and inapplicable to 10 Let R be a region of space, and let a be the proposition "O is inside R." It is generally considered sufficient for the truth of a that the support of the retarded ("prepared") wave function associated with O's center of mass is contained in R. Considering the time-symmetry of the underlying physics, it ought to be equally sufficient for the truth of a that the support of the corresponding advanced ("retropared") wave function is inside R. And considering that in general only the ABL probabilities are objective, it ought to suffice that the ABL probability associated with a is 1. (To be precise, it ought to suffice that the ABL probability associated with the counterfactual "If there were a matter of fact about the presence or otherwise of O in R, O would be in R," is 1.)
According to the PIQM, none of these conditions is sufficient for the truth of a. The necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of O in R at a time t is the existence of a matter of fact that indicates O's presence in R at t. If there isn't any such matter of fact (at t or at any time before or after t), and if there also isn't any event or state of affairs that indicates O's absence from R at t, then a is meaningless, and O's position with respect to R (inside or outside) is objectively undefined -where O at the time t is concerned, nothing in the world corresponds to the distinction between "inside R" and "outside R."
The conceptual distinctions we make between mutually disjoint regions of space thus may or may not be real for a given object at a given time. The distinction between R and its complement R ′ is real for O if there is a matter of fact from which O's position with respect to R (inside or outside) can be inferred; otherwise it is not. This implies that the multiplicity inherent in our mathematical concept of space (a transfinite set of triplets of real numbers) is not an intrinsic feature of physical space. If the distinctions inherent in that concept were physically real per se (that is, if they were real for every physical object), the two slits in a double-slit experiment with atoms would be distinct per se (that is, they would be distinct for whatever passes through them). In this case the individual atom could not pass simultaneously through both slits as a whole (that is, without being divided into two distinct parts by the intrinsically distinct slits). But this is what it does when interference fringes are observed. The existence of the fringes proves that the slits (and the corresponding trajectories) are not distinct for the atoms and that, a fortiori, spatial distinctions are not real per se. According to the PIQM, the notion that the multiplicity and the distinctions inherent in our concept of space are intrinsic to physical space (and that, consequently, the individual points of space or space-time can be treated as the carriers of physical qualities) is a delusion. This notion perhaps more than any other prevents us from understanding how probabilities can be an intrinsic objective feature of the physical world. It is as inconsistent with quantum mechanics as the notion of absolute simultaneity is with special relativity.
IV. WHAT HAS QUANTUM MECHANICS TO DO WITH FACTS?
It is widely believed that it is the business of quantum mechanics to account for the occurrence/existence of actual events or states of affairs. From the point of view of the PIQM, this too is a misconception. Quantum mechanics assigns probabilities (whether Born or ABL) to alternative events or states of affairs only if a set of alternative events or states of affairs is specified and only on the supposition that exactly one of these happens or obtains. The probabilities are determined by facts (the "preparation" and/or the "retroparation"), and they are probabilities of possible facts. But the probability assignments are correct only if one assumes (in the case of objective probabilities, counterfactually) that one of a given set of mutually contradictory possibilities is a fact.
To illustrate this point, consider two perfect detectors D 1 and D 2 having the respective (disjoint) sensitive regions R 1 and R 2 . If the support of the wave function associated with the (center-of-mass) position of O is neither wholly inside R 1 nor wholly inside R 2 , nothing necessitates the detection of O by D 1 , and nothing necessitates the detection of O by D 2 . Yet if the wave function vanishes outside R 1 ∪ R 2 , either of the detectors is certain to click. How come? How is it that two perfect detectors with sensitive regions R 1 and R 2 constitute a perfect detector with sensitive region R 1 ∪ R 2 ? What is it that causes either of the detectors to click? The answer is, nothing. If we assign probabilities to alternative detection events on the basis of a (normalized) wave function that vanishes outside of the union of the detectors' sensitive regions, we implicitly assume that exactly one of the detectors clicks.
Quantum mechanics tells us either of two things: (i) If there is going to be a matter of fact about the alternative taken (from a specific range of alternatives) then such and such are the (subjective Born) probabilities with which that matter of fact will indicate this or that alternative. (ii) If there were a matter of fact about the alternative taken (from a specific range of alternatives) then such and such are the (objective ABL) probabilities with which that matter of fact would indicate this or that alternative. Quantum mechanics never allows us to infer that a matter of fact will be created or has been created, and for this reason it cannot account for the occurrence/existence of an actual event or state of affairs. This is also the reason why one cannot attribute an "element of reality" on the mere basis that a quantum-mechanical probability happens to be 1, as is done, for instance, by Redhead.
Redhead 16 has formulated the following "sufficiency" condition: "If we can predict with certainty, or at any rate with probability one, the result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, then at the time t there exists an element of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having a value equal to the predicted measurement result." This condition is not sufficient because quantum mechanics never tells us what will be the case, unconditionally. It only tells us what would be the case if some condition or other were met. Even if the Born probability of a particular event or state of affairs F is 1, we are not entitled to infer that F happens or obtains. What we are entitled to infer is only this: Given that one of a specified set of alternative events or states of affairs happens or obtains, the event or state of affairs that happens or obtains is F . Even the predictions of the standard formalism are conditionals. In order to get from a true conditional to an element of reality a condition has to be met: a measurement must be successfully performed, a matter of fact about the value of an observable must be created, one of a specified set of alternative property-defining events or states of affairs must happen or obtain. The failure to recognize and acknowledge the conditionality of quantum-mechanical predictions has spawned an entire industry devoted to solving the so-called "measurement problem."
On the erroneous view that the state vector represents some actual state of affairs, one is led to believe that the superposition |ψ = a|a + b|b (1) represents S as in some sense having the respective properties represented by |a and |b , and that the apparatus+system "state"
represents the apparatus as in some sense indicating the respective properties represented by |a and |b . The measurement problem is the spurious problem of understanding the transition from the "and" of equation (1) to "or:"
It is worth pointing out that as a superposition of indicating properties (2) is self-contradictory. Suppose that the Hilbert space of the apparatus is spanned by just three mutally orthogonal kets: |N , |A and |B . |N represents the neutral state in which the apparatus does not indicate a result. If the operator P F projects on the subspace spanned by |A and |B (that is, if it represents the property of indicating a result, no matter which), |N is the eigenstate of the corresponding binary observable with eigenvalue 0, and the superposition |Ψ is an eigenstate of the corresponding binary observable with eigenvalue 1. In other words, if (2) obtains, the apparatus indicates a result -there is a matter of fact from which the result can be inferred.
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On the other hand, a superposition of states with mutually contradictory properties can be the correct basis for assigning objective probabilities only if the difference between those properties is not real for the system. For instance, if |a and |b represent S as being inside the respective (disjoint) regions R a and R b , |ψ can be the correct basis for assigning objective probabilities if and only if R a and R b are not distinct for S (that is, if and only if there isn't any matter of fact from which either the presence of S in or the absence of S from either R a or R b can be inferred). By the same measure, |Ψ can be the correct basis for assigning objective probabilities only if (i) the respective properties represented by |a and |b are not distinct for S and (ii) the respective properties represented by |A and |B are not distinct for the apparatus. But if the properties represented by |a and |b are not distinct for S, there isn't any matter of fact from which the possession by S of either |a or |b can be inferred, whence it follows that there isn't any apparatus that indicates which of the two properties is possessed by S.
The assumption that there is an actual state of affairs represented by (2) , thus leads to the absurd conclusion that the apparatus both does and does not indicate a result. In truth, (1) only tells us this: if there were a matter of fact from which either the property represented by |a or the property represented by |b could be inferred, then that matter of fact would indicate the property represented by |a with probability a 2 , and it would indicate the property represented by |b with probability b 2 . And (2) only tells us that if there were a matter of fact from which either |A (and hence |a ) or |B (and hence |b ) could be inferred, then that matter of fact would indicate |A (and hence |a ) with probability a 2 , and it would indicate |B (and hence |b ) with probability b 2 . It is self-evident that if there is a matter of fact from which either |a or |b can be inferred, and if this matter of fact is taken into account, the correct basis for further conditional inferences is not (1) but either |a or |b , depending on which of the two can be inferred. This obvious truism is the entire content of the so-called projection postulate.
18,19
If the PIQM is correct, all attempts to coax "classicality" (actual events, matters of fact) out of quantum mechanics (via environment-induced superselection, 20 are misconceived and futile. Quantum mechanics takes us from facts to probabilities of possible facts; it cannot take us from possibilities to facts. The question of how it is that exactly one possibility is realized must not be asked of a formalism that serves to assign probabilities on the implicit assumption that exactly one of a specified set of possibilities is realized. Even the step from probability 1 to factuality crosses a gulf that quantum mechanics cannot bridge. Quantum mechanics can tell us that O is certain to be found in R a given that there is a matter of fact about its presence or otherwise in R a , but only the actual matter of fact warrants the inference that O is in R a . The step from probability 1 ("certainty") to a factually warranted inference takes us from a set of possible worlds (the framework in which counterfactuals are often discussed) to the real world. Quantum mechanics only takes us from the real world to the realm of possible worlds, and there it leaves us. But not only quantum mechanics fails to return us to reality. Out of that imaginary realm no logical road leads back to the real world.
Measurements that are merely possible do not have actual results. Left to its own resources, quantum mechanics appears to lead us into a Borgesian "garden of forking paths."
35 Everytime a matter of fact about the state of S is created such as cannot be predicted with certainty on the basis of previously created matters of fact, another object gets entangled with S, and the more objects are entangled with S, the more rapidly the entanglement spreads. The "many-worlds extravanganza" (to once again quote Mermin) gives shape to this fiction. What it overlooks is that the fiction is set in the realm of possible worlds. The purpose that the state vector serves in the real world is to assign (Born) probabilities to conditional statements: If there is a matter of fact about the value of some observable, then such and such are the probabilities with which that matter of fact indicates the various possible values. And if there is a matter of fact about the value indicated by the apparatus, then such and such are the probabilities with which that matter of fact indicates the various possible results. And so on. But if there is any such matter of fact, then it is tautologically true that one of the possible values is actually possessed by the observable, and is actually indicated by the apparatus, and so on. In other words, if there is any such matter of fact, those probabilities are based on an incomplete set of facts and are therefore subjective. All that ever gets objectively entangled is counterfactuals.
V. DO MEASUREMENTS ACTUALIZE POTENTIALITIES?
The measurement problem is sometimes referred to as "the problem of actualizing potentialities." 36, 37 The notion that quantum mechanics has something to do with the actualization of potentialities, which goes back to Heisenberg, 38 is misleading inasmuch as it suggests that the transition from potential to actual is a process of some kind (i.e., that it takes place in time and within a single world). If it is at all appropriate to think of a measurement in terms of a transition, this is not a transition in time (that is, not a physical transition from an earlier to a later state of affairs) but a "transition" from one possible world, in which a specified measurement is not performed at a stipulated time, to another possible world, in which the same measurement is performed at the stipulated time, as I proceed to show. The idea that measurements actualize potentialities is an improvement over the idea that the state vector represents an actual state of affairs, but it still misses the point that the timedependence of the state vector is a dependence on a stipulated time, not the dependence of a state of affairs that evolves in time -not even if this consists in an evolving collection of propensities 39 or an evolving network of potentialities. 36, 37 Probabilities associated with events that may happen or states of affairs that may obtain (or that could have happened or obtained) do not exist or evolve in time, anymore than the probability of being found inside a region R is located inside R. The dependence of a quantum-mechanical probability on time is a dependence on the specified time of the possible event or state of affairs to which it is assigned. What is it that tricks us so persistently into thinking that there must be an instantaneous state that evolves in time? If there is such a state, then of course the quantum formalism leaves us no choice but to identify it with the time-dependent state vector or density operator of the Schrödinger picture. But as soon as we do this we are landed with the pseudoproblem of why the state vector sometimes appears to unpredictably 40 "collapse," and with the equally spurious problem of whether the "collapse" of the state vector is a real physical occurrence or something that happens only "for all practical purposes." These problems are not solved by construing state-vector "collapses" as transitions from possibilities to facts. They are "solved" by recognizing them as pseudoproblems, created by the fallacious notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time, and the consequent construal of the state vector as such a state. To my mind, the root fallacy is the idea that the experiential now has anything to do with physics. The proper view of physical reality is not only what Nagel 41 has called "the view from nowhere" (physical reality is independent of the particular spatial location whence I survey the world); it is also what Price 9 has called "the view from nowhen." Physical reality is independent of the particular time (the present) whence I survey the spatio-temporal whole. As was shown in Sec. 2, this entails that there is no place in physics for the qualitative difference that exists in conscious experience between the past, the present, and the future. It further entails that in this spatio-temporal whole there is no place for a "moving" now, a "flowing" time, or an "advancing" present. In fact, the Whiteheadian concept 42 of an advancing present is incoherent, for the following reasons: it depicts space-time as a simultaneous whole persisting in a time that is extraneous to space-time, and it depicts the present as advancing through this persisting simultaneous whole in that extraneous time. In reality there is only one time, the fourth dimension of space-time. There is not another time in which the present "advances" through space-time as if space-time where a persisting simultaneous whole. Nor is it consistent to think of space-time as a simultaneous whole. One may select any one-parameter family of spacelike hypersurfaces and call the parameter "time" and the hypersurfaces "simultaneities." As far as physics is concerned, this bijective association of states with times is all there is to time. One cannot pick a specific time and attach to the corresponding simultaneity the exclusive reality of the experiential now, let alone picture the now as advancing from simultaneity to simultaneity as if the simultaneities that are past or future relative to "now" existed simultaneously with the now. Note that these conclusions are independent of the fact that we live in a relativistic world. In a world in which the bijective association between times and simultaneities is a matter of choice, it is just more obvious that the exclusive reality of the experiential now cannot be attributed to any particular simultaneity.
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If the concept of an instantaneous state is an unwarranted importation from our successive time experience into the world of physics, then so is the following concomitant complex of "folk" conceptions about time and causality: Since the future is (not yet) real, it cannot influence the present, so retrocausation is impossible. And since the past is (no longer) real, it can influence the present only by persisting through time (that is, by the persistence right up to the present of something that was real, however it may have changed in the meanwhile). Causal influences reach from the nonexistent past into the nonexistent future by being "carried through time" by the present. The evolving instantaneous state thus not only represents presently possessed properties but also encapsulates everything in the past that is causally relevant to the future. Hence the concept of a "field of force" that evolves in time (and therefore, in a relativistic world, evolves according to the principle of local action), and that "mediates" between the past and the future (and therefore, in a relativistic world, between "here" and "there"). Hence also the notion that the state vector plays a similar causally mediating rôle.
In reality, the properties of S at different times do not "dangle" causally from each other; instead they "dangle" ontologically from -that is, they depend for their existence on -matters of fact about what they are. If we find that at times t 1 and t 2 the system has the properties represented by |ψ 1 (t 1 ) and |ψ 2 (t 2 ) , respectively, we learn nothing about the properties possessed by S at other times. We learn nothing about an actual state of affairs that obtains in the meantime. If there isn't any matter of fact about what S is like in the meantime, then there isn't anything that S is like in the meantime. And since the properties of S at different times do not "dangle" causally from each other, there is no need to fill the temporal gap between t 1 and t 2 with an evolving instantaneous state.
Moreover, it stands to reason that what is true of the distinctions inherent in our mathematical concept of space, is also true of the distinctions inherent in our mathematical concept of time: neither set of distinctions is physically real per se. Neither are positions intrinsic to space, nor are instants intrinsic to time. While the possessed positions "dangle" from positionindicating events or states of affairs, the times at which they are possessed "dangle" from time-indicating events or states of affairs; they too are extrinsic, they too are what can be inferred from the goings-on in the rest of the world. Hence if there isn't anything that S is like at any time between t 1 and t 2 (because there isn't any matter of fact about what S is like at any intermediate time), then, where S is concerned, there also isn't any intermediate time. In particular, there isn't any time at which one could attribute to S a collection of propensities or a network of potentialities.
The transition from a superposition of the form i a i |a i to one of the kets |a i cannot be a transition from a potential state of affairs that obtains "just before" the measurement, to an actual state of affairs that obtains at the time of the measurement (and on to another potential state of affairs that obtains "just after" the measurement) because, where the system is concerned, the times "just before" and "just after" the measurement do not exist. A fortiori, there isn't anything that the system is like at those time, whether actually or potentially.
Hence the difference between i a i |a i and a particular ket |a i cannot be a difference in time and within the same world; it is a difference between possible worlds at the same time. In a world in which i a i |a i is the correct basis for probability assignments to counterfactuals, the measurement of the observable whose eigenstates are given by the kets |a i is not performed at the stipulated time. In those worlds in which it is performed at the stipulated time, one of the kets |a i represents both a property that is actually possessed at that time and a (partial) inference basis for probability assignments to counterfactuals pertaining to earlier or later times.
VI. THE MEANING OF "MEASUREMENT"
Mermin asks: (1) "Why should the scope of physics be restricted to the artificial contrivances we are forced to resort to in our efforts to probe the world?" (2) "Why should a fundamental theory have to take its meaning from a notion of 'measurement' external to the theory itself? Should not the meaning of 'measurement' emerge from the theory, rather than the other way round?" (3) "Should not physics be able to make statements about the unmeasured, unprepared world?" The answers to these questions are as follows.
(1) If by "measurement" we mean a manipulation that is intended to determine the value of a given observable or that leads to the acquisition of knowledge, the scope of physics is not restricted to measurements. What is relevant is the occurrence or existence of an event or state of affairs warranting the assertability of a statement of the form "S has the property p at the time t," irrespective of whether anyone is around to assert, or take cognizance, of that event or state of affairs, and irrespective of whether it has been anyone's intention to learn something about S. Bohr insisted that quantum systems should not be thought of as possessing properties independently of experimental arrangements. 44 By interpreting his sagacious insistence on the necessity of describing quantum phenomena in terms of experimental arrangements 45,46 as restricting quantum mechanics "to be exclusively about piddling laboratory operations," one does him an injustice. For "experimental arrangement" read: the totality of matters of fact about the properties possessed by the system at a given time. A "measurement result," properly understood, does not have to be the outcome of a laboratory experiment. Any matter of fact that "is about" (has a bearing on) the properties of a physical system, qualifies as a measurement result. The reason this is so is that the (contingent) properties of physical systems are extrinsic. They are objectively defined in terms of the actual events or states of affairs from which they can be inferred. They "dangle" from what happens or is the case in the rest of the world.
(2) The (proper) notion of "measurement" is external to the theory in the sense that locutions such as "actual event," "actual state of affairs," "matter of fact" cannot be defined in quantum-mechanical terms. This view is not likely to be popular with theoretical physicists who naturally prefer to define their concepts in terms of the mathematical formalism they use. Einstein spent the last thirty years of his life trying (in vain) to get rid of field sources, those bits of "stuff" that have the insolence to be real by themselves rather than by courtesy of some equation. 47 Small wonder if he resisted Bohr's insight that not even the properties of things can be defined in purely mathematical terms. But that's the way it is. The properties of things are objectively defined in terms of what actually happens or obtains; they cannot be defined in purely mathematical terms, for only intrinsic properties can be so defined. Quantum mechanics concerns the correlations between extrinsic properties or, equivalently, between matters of fact about possessed properties; it has to presuppose the property-defining facts because it can neither account for their existence nor define them in purely mathematical terms. 48 Mermin's claim that the correlations but not the correlata are physically real, could be construed in precisely this sense; this would result in an essential agreement between the IIQM and the PIQM. As I gather from private communications, Mermin is not averse to such an interpretation of the IIQM. (3) Physics is able to make statements about the unmeasured world, but only in the terms of the measured world (that is, only in terms of counterfactuals) -with one exception. While in the first place quantum mechanics is about statistical correlations among facts, to a certain extent it allows us to infer an underlying reality that is responsible for the correlations. Suppose that we perform a series of position measurements, and that every position measurement yields exactly one result (that is, each time exactly one detector clicks). Then we are entitled to infer the existence of an entity O which persists through time (if not for all time), to think of the clicks given off by the detectors as matters of fact about the successive positions of this entity, to think of the behavior of the detectors as position measurements, and to think of the detectors as detectors. (The lack of transtemporal identity among particles of the same type of course forbids us to extend to such particles the individuality of a fully "classical" entity.) The successive positions of O, however, cannot be intrinsic: they are what can be inferred from the pattern of clicks. All that can be inferred concerning O's positions at times at which no detector clicks, is counterfactual and probabilistic. 49 There is a persistent entity all right, but there is then no actually possessed position to go with it. The probabilities that quantum mechanics assigns to the not actually possessed properties of O at a (not actually existing) time t are what they are because the facts are what they are. But the facts never are what they are because the probabilities are what they are. Probability 1 does not imply actuality. Quantum mechanics does not predict that a measurement will take place, nor the time at which one will take place, nor does it specify the conditions in which one will take place. And if quantum mechanics is as fundamental as I believe it is, nothing allows us to predict that or when a measurement takes place, or to specify conditions in which one is certain to take place, for there is nothing that causes a measurement to take place. In other words, a matter of fact about the value of an observable is a causal primary. A causal primary is an event or state of affairs the occurrence or existence of which is not necessitated by any cause, antecedent or otherwise.
I do not mean to say that in general nothing causes a measurement to yield this particular value rather than that. Unless one postulates hidden variables, this is a triviality. What I mean to say is that nothing ever causes a measurement to take place. Measurements (and in clear this means detection events) are causal primaries. No detector is 100% efficient. Using similar detectors in series, it is easy to experimentally establish a detector's likelihood to click when the corresponding Born probability is 1, but of this likelihood no theoretical account is possible.
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A fortiori, no theoretical account is possible of why or when a detector is certain to click. It never is.
Quantum physics thus is concerned with correlations between events or states of affairs that are uncaused and therefore fundamentally inexplicable. As physicists we are not likely to take kindly to this conclusion, which may account for the blind spot behind which its inevitability has been hidden so long. To the best of my knowledge, Mermin is the first who has bitten the bullet -or would have done so, had he not backed the wrong horse (consciousness). For by denying physical reality to the correlata, he in effect declares that, at least where physics is concerned, the existence of the correlata (that is, of actually possessed property or of matters of fact about them) is fundamentally inexplicable.
The world is a mass of events that are causal primaries. Without any correlations between these events, it would be a total chaos. As it turns out, the uncaused events are strongly correlated. If we don't look too closely, they fall into neat patterns that can be thought of as persistent objects with definite and continuously evolving positions. Projecting our timeasymmetric agent causality into the time-symmetric world of physics, we think of the positions possessed at later times as causally determined by the positions possessed at earlier times. If we look more closely, we find that positions aren't always attributable, and that those that are attributable aren't always predictable on the basis of past events. We discover that positions do not "dangle" from earlier positions by causal strings but instead "dangle" from positiondefining events that are statistically correlated but (being causal primaries) are not causally connected. We discover entangled counterfactuals, and we wonder what remains amenable to causal explanation.
VII. DIACHRONIC CORRELATIONS AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION
What indeed? Diachronically, neither the fact that at t 1 O is found at location A nor the fact that at t 3 O is found at location C explains why at the intermediate time t 2 O is found at location B -not even if the Born probability (or the time-reversed Born probability, or the ABL probability) of finding O at B is 1 at t 2 . Matters of fact about the successive positions of O are causal primaries. Only if there is a matter of fact F about O's whereabouts at t 2 and the Born probability of finding O at B is 1 at t 2 , can we can predict that F will indicate O's presence at B. If instead the time-reversed Born probability of finding O at B is 1 at t 2 , we can "retrodict" that F indicated O's presence at B. For three (logically connected) reasons the latter possibility strikes us as bizarre: (i) we impose on time-symmetric correlations the asymmetric causality of a conscious agent; (ii) we project the exclusive reality of the experiential now into an evolving instantaneous state that propagates causal influences through time; (iii) we think of positions as intrinsic properties. If O's position were intrinsic, O would be found at B because it is at B. And if in addition O's successive positions were connected by time-asymmetric causality, O would be at B because of its position and state of motion at an earlier time. In reality O is at B because it is found at B, and if the time-reversed Born probability of finding O at B is 1, O is as much found at B (rather than somewhere else) at the time t 2 because of the way it is "retropared" as it is found at C at the time t 3 because of the way it is "prepared."
If we want to make sense of quantum mechanics, we must stop thinking of O's (Born) position probability distribution as representing a continuously evolving actual state of affairs. O isn't something that of itself has a more or less "fuzzy" position at all times. O is the persistent entity whose existence we infer from a pattern of clicks. There is a succession of factually warranted positions that we can think of as the successive positions of one and the same entity O -as long as other entities of the same type can be kept out of the way. The correlations that allow us to think of the pattern of clicks as matters of fact about the successive positions of a single entity O, also allow us to assign probabilities to counterfactual statements about O's whereabouts at a time at which there isn't any matter of fact about O's whereabouts. If the probability assigned to a counterfactual is 1, the counterfactual is true. Take the counterfactual "If there where a matter of fact about O's present whereabouts, it would with certainty indicate O's presence at B." If this counterfactual is true, the reason why it is true is not that presently O is at B. That reason is not to be found in any property presently possessed by O, nor in any state of affairs that presently obtains. So what accounts for the truth of this counterfactual, or more generally, for the correlations between property-defining matters of fact? The answer is: nothing. Nothing accounts for the joint probability distributions that quantum mechanics is concerned with. These are what they are because they are what they are. It would be self-contradictory to try to explain a fundamental theory, and quantum mechanics is a truly fundamental theory. Causal explanations belong to the familiar macroworld of causal processes and things that evolve in time. This world is something we construct out of the correlations and their uncaused correlata, and the construction works only as long as we don't look too closely. It is not something more fundamental, something that could in any manner account for the correlations and/or the correlata. It sits on top of them, and it doesn't sit too well on them.
What can and ought to be understood is what these correlations (or the objective probabilities) tell us about the world. For one thing, they tell us that the positions of things are objectively indefinite or "fuzzy." This does not mean that O has as fuzzy position. It means that statements of the form "O is in R at t" are sometimes neither true nor false but meaningless. This tells us that the position of O is an extrinsic property. And this tells us that the conceptual distinctions inherent in our mathematical conception of space do not inhere in physical space. "Here" and "there" are not per se distinct. Whether or not they are distinct for a given object at a given time depends on the time and the object. R 1 and R 2 are distinct for O at the time t if and only if an actual event or state of affairs indicates O's presence at t in either R 1 or R 2 .
If "here" and "there" are not distinct per se, reality is fundamentally nonseparable. Like the positions of things, spatial distinctions "dangle" from actual events or states of affairs. Reality is not built on a space that is intrinsically differentiated the way our mathematical concept of space is differentiated. Reality is built on matters of fact, and the existing differences between "here" and "there" are the differences that can be inferred from matters of fact. The positions of macroscopic objects appear to be taken from a storehouse of preexistent positions that is isomorphic to our mathematical concept of space, because macroscopic objects appear to follow definite trajectories. And they appear to follow definite trajectories, and thus appear to possess intrinsic positions, because all matters of fact about the positions of macroscopic objects are predictable. But this entire complex of interrelated "classical" notions crumbles the moment we realize that positions are fundamentally unpredictable.
Let me explain what I mean by a "macroscopic object." There is a class of objects that satisfy the following criterion: any factually warranted inference about the position of M at any time t is predictable (with certainty) on the basis of factually warranted inferences about the positions of M at earlier times. A macroscopic object is an object that satisfies this criterion. To the extent that they can be inferred from events, the successive positions of a macroscopic object evolve deterministically. This makes it possible to ignore the fact that the positions of macroscopic objects, like all actually possessed positions, depend for their existence on positionindicating events. We can treat the positions of macroscopic objects as intrinsic properties and assume that they follow definite and causally determined trajectories, without ever risking to be contradicted by an actual event.
I do not mean to say that the position of a macroscopic object M really is definite. There aren't any events that would warrant this inference. Even the positions of macroscopic objects are fuzzy, but not manifestly so: the positional indefiniteness of M does not evince itself through unpredictable position-indicating events. Nor do I mean to say that the positions of macroscopic objects really are intrinsic. They too "dangle" from actual events. But they do so in a way that is predictable, that does not reveal any fuzziness. We may think of macroscopic objects as following definite trajectories. Or we may think of them as following fuzzy trajectories. Since all matters of fact about their positions are predictable, it makes no difference: the fuzziness has no factual conseqences. Classical behavior results when the factually warranted positions fuse into a not manifestly fuzzy trajectory. This has little to do with the "classical limit" in which the wave packet shrinks to a continuously moving point, for the wave packet (of whatever "size") is a bundle of probabilities associated with time-dependent counterfactuals, not the (more or less fuzzy) actual trajectory of an object. (Good examples of how not to get from quantum to classical are the unsuccessful attempts to obtain the exponential decay law, which pertains to factually warranted inferences and is consistent with all experimental data, from the Schrödinger equation, which tells us how the probabilities associated with counterfactuals depend on time.
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By saying that matters of fact about the positions of macroscopic objects are predictable, I do not mean that the creation or existence of such a matter of fact is predictable. Once again, a Born probability equal to 1 does not allow us to predict that an event will happen. Only if it is taken for granted that exactly one of a range of possible events will happen, does a Born probability equal to 1 allow us to predict which event will happen. What I mean by saying that matters of fact about the (successive) positions of a macroscopic object are predictable, is this: what an actual event implies regarding the position of a macroscopic object is consistent with what can be predicted with the help of some classical dynamical law on the basis of earlier position-defining events.
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When I speak of the creation of a matter of fact, I mean the occurrence of an actual event or the (coming into) existence of an actual state of affairs. This is something that cannot be erased or undone. According to Wheeler's interpretation of the Copenhagen interpretation, "no elementary quantum phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is registered, recorded, 'brought to a close' by an 'irreversible act of amplification,' such as the blackening of a grain of photographic emulsion or the triggering of a counter."
54 According to the PIQM, there is no such thing as an "irreversible act of amplification." As long as what is amplified is counterfactuals, the "act of amplification" is reversible. No amount of amplification succeeds in turning a counterfactual into a fact. No matter how many counterfactuals get entangled, they remain counterfactuals.
On the other hand, once a matter of fact is created, it is logically impossible to erase it. For the relevant matter of fact is not that the needle deflects to the left (in which case one could "erase" it by returning the needle to the neutral position). The relevant matter of fact is that at a time t the needle deflects (or points) to the left. This is a timeless truth. If at the time t the needle deflects to the left, then it always has been and always will be true that at the time t the needle deflects to the left. Note that an apparatus pointer is not a macroscopic object according to the above definition. In general there is nothing that allows one to predict which way the needle will deflect. Only before and after the deflection event does the needle behave as a macroscopic object. Isn't such a definition self-defeating? It would be so if it were designed to explain why the needle deflects left or right (rather than both left and right). But such an explanation is neither required nor possible. If past events allow us to infer a superposition of the form (2) -with |left and |right in place of |A and |B -they allow us to infer that if there is a matter of fact about the direction in which the needle deflects, it warrants the inference "left" with probability a 2 , and it warrants the inference "right" with probability b 2 . Nothing allows us to predict the creation of such a matter of fact. It happens when it happens. The deflection event is a causal primary, notwithstanding that it happens with a measurable probability, and that by a suitable choice of apparatus we can make this probability reasonably large. As I stressed in Ref. 11 , what is true of particles in double-slit experiments is equally true of cats in double-door experiments. Except for the myriads of matters of fact about the door taken by the cat, "the door taken by the cat" is objectively undefined. This seems to entail a vicious regress. We infer the positions of particles from the positions of the detectors that click. But the positions of detectors are extrinsic, too. They are what they are because of the matters of fact from which one can (in principle) infer what they are. This means that there are detector detectors from which the positions of particle detectors are inferred, and then there are detectors from which the positions of detector detectors are inferred, and so on ad infinitum. However, as we regress from particle detectors to detector detectors and so on, we sooner or later (sooner rather than later) encounter a macroscopic detector whose position is not manifestly fuzzy. There the buck stops. The positions of all things are defined in terms of the (not manifestly fuzzy) positions of macroscopic things.
It is therefore consistent to think of the deflection of the pointer needle as one of those uncaused actual events on which the (contingent) properties of things depend for their existence. Prima facie we have another vicious regress: Like all contingent properties, the initial and final positions of the needle are what they are because of what happens or is the case in the rest of the world. They thus presuppose other "deflection" events, which presuppose yet other "deflection" events, and so on ad infinitum. But since before and after the deflection event the needle behaves as a macroscopic object, its initial and final positions are quantitatively defined independently of what happens elsewhere. They are positions of the kind that are used to define positions. Hence the deflection event -the transition from the initial to the final position -is also independent of what happens elsewhere.
VIII. SYNCHRONIC CORRELATIONS AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION
The paradigm example of synchronic correlations is (Bohm's 2 version of) the experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR). 55 Suppose that at the time t 0 two spin-1/2 particles are in the singlet state (that is, suppose there is a matter of fact by which this inference is warranted). At t 1 > t 0 Alice measures the spin component of the first particle with respect to some axis, and at t 2 > t 0 Bob measures the spin component of the second particle with respect to the same or a different axis. The temporal order of t 1 and t 2 is irrelevant. Whenever Alice and Bob choose the same axis, their results are perfectly anticorrelated. Can there be a causal explanation for this phenomenon? That the common-cause explanation fails is well known. Nor is agent causality involved, for two reasons. First, Bob's choice exerts no causally determining influence on the result obtained by Alice (and vice versa): no matter which axes they choose, the odds that Alice will obtain ↑ or ↓ are always fifty-fifty. Second, the correlations are perfectly symmetric. If Alice and Bob obtain the respective results ↑ However, what Alice and Bob contribute to determine is probabilities, and probabilities are neither situated in space nor do they exist in time. What Alice and Bob do not in any way contribute to determine is what actually happens or obtains at a spacelike separation from their respective measurements. Einstein was absolutely right: "the real factual situation of the system S 2 is independent of what is done with the system S 1 ."
56 EPR correlations do not imply any action at a distance, spooky 57 or otherwise. The concepts of action and causation are simply out of place. Diachronic correlations that are not manifestly indeterministic can be passed off as causal explanations. We can impose on them our agent causality with some measure of consistency, even though this compels us to use a wrong criterion: temporal precedence takes the place of causal independence as the criterion which distinguishes the cause from the effect. But when we deal with synchronic correlations or correlations that are manifestly indeterministic, the imposition of agent causality does not work. Trying to causally explain these correlations is putting the cart in front of the horse. It is the correlations that explain why causal explanations work to the extent they do. There are no causal explanations for the correlations because the correlations are "more" fundamental than the world of causal processes that we can sometimes construct out of the correlations and their correlata.
For Wittgenstein the world consisted primarily of facts rather than of things. He would be pleased to learn that uncaused matters of fact are indeed the fundamental building blocks of both the macro and the micro world. The latter world is different from the former only in that its properties "dangle" manifestly and undeniably from what happens in the rest of the world, while the properties of the macro world can be thought of as "dangling" causally from each other, forming an apparently self-contained system of objects with apparently intrinsic properties.
There are two types of matters of fact: those that permit themselves to be thought of as causally connected (though in reality they are not), and those that are manifestly uncaused. If all matters of fact were of the former type, the world would be classical (assuming that a self-consistent classical world is possible, which I doubt). The fact that some matters of fact are manifestly uncaused entails that at bottom all of them are uncaused. The saving grace is that those matters of fact that are predictable allow themselves to be thought of as causally connected states or events in the histories of interacting objects that evolve in time.
We just have to keep in mind that this is only an "as if" description, albeit the best of all possible descriptions. The real world is the totality of matters of fact that simply are (plus their correlations). Yet when we state these matters of fact, they are integrated into the macro world which "sits on top" of the correlations. Although the matters of fact are the "stuff" from which the macro world is made, we cannot describe them except in terms of the finished product, the macro world in which counters click and needles deflect. This of course is what Bohr 58 was trying to tell us all along.
IX. EPILOGUE
And still one wants to know how it can be like that 59 -not how EPR correlations work but simply how they are possible at all. As I see it, the fundamental stumbling block is what could be called the fallacy of separability. It is the view that "...all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another.... We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distance between points.... And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated.... And that is all.... All else supervenes on that."
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If an atom can pass -as a whole -through two slits at once, the slits cannot demarcate spatial locations that are intrinsically distinct from each other. (If they did, the atom could not simultanously pass through both of them without being divided into two parts.) The distinctions inherent in our mathematical concept of space therefore cannot be intrinsic to physical space. The distinction between "here" and "there" is not real per se. Like the positions of things, spatial distinctions are real only to the extent that matters of fact warrant the assertability of their existence. In and of itself, physical space -or the reality underlying itis undifferentiated, one.
Newton's law of gravity created a problem concerning which Newton himself refused to "frame hypotheses:" How is action at a distance possible? Field theories are often hailed as providing the solution to the perceived paradox of unmediated action across spatial distances. But field theories are committed to the intrinsic distinctness of space-time points as well as to the principle of local action (a.k.a. local causality) according to which the "local matters of particular fact" at a point P are influenced only by the "local matters of particular fact" in the infinitesimal neighborhood of P -as if the electromagnetic interaction were explained by, rather than contributed to explain, what goes on when a hammer strikes a nail.
61 If space-time points are not intrinsically distinct, the principle of local action is left without application. Nor is it needed to solve the problem of action at a distance, for this arises only if space-time points are intrinsically distinct. If in and of itself "here" is not distinct from "there," there is no problem. What happens or is the case "here" can be correlated with what happens or is the case "there" because, fundamentally, "here" and "there" are identical not just in the sense of "being of the same type" but in the sense of strict numerical identity. At bottom there is only one place, and it is everywhere. If action at a distance requires a medium, that identity (or this ubiquity) is the medium. On the other hand, if there is no intrinsic difference, there is no intrinsic distance, so the problem of action at a distance doesn't actually arise. Where EPR correlations are concerned, action at a distance is neither the problem nor the solution.
APPENDIX: GLOSSARY
ABL probability. The probability
2 with which a measurement of the observable A performed on a system S between the "preparation" of the state |Ψ 1 and the "retroparation" of the state |Ψ 2 yields the result a i . The operator P A=a i projects on the subspace corresponding to the eigenvalue a i of A. ABL probabilities are based on past and future matters of fact about the possessed properties of S.
Agent causality. The time-asymmetric causality of the goal-directed activities of a conscious agent in a successively experience world. Mostly superimposed on the time-symmetric causal links of classical physics and the time-symmetric relation in quantum physics between measurements and probability assignments.
Born probability. The probability P B (a i ) = | Ψ|P A=a i |Ψ | with which a measurement of the observable A on a system S performed after the so-called "preparation" of the state |Ψ yields the result a i . The operator P A=a i projects on the subspace corresponding to the eigenvalue a i of A. Born probabilities are based only on the relevant past matters of fact about the possessed properties of S.
Causal primary. An event or state of affairs the occurrence or existence of which is not necessitated by any cause, antecedent or otherwise.
Conditional. A hypothetical statement, i.e., a compound statement of the form "If p then q." Component p is called the antecedent.
Contingent property. A property of a system S that (at any time) may but need not be possessed by S. Being inside a given region of space and having a spin component of +h/2 along a given axis are contingent properties of electrons.
Contrary-to-fact conditional. A conditional that presupposes the falsity of its antecedent. Correlata. The correlated possible results of possible measurements performed either on the same system at different times or on different systems. Quantum mechanics concerns nothing but these correlations.
Counterfactual.
A contrary-to-fact conditional. Dangle. Extrinsic properties "dangle" from what happens or is the case in the rest of the world W − S in the sense that they are defined in terms of the goings-on in W − S: they depend for their existence on some actual event or state of affairs that can be described without reference to S but has implications concerning the possessed properties of S.
Diachronic correlations. Correlations between the results of local measurements performed on the same system at different times.
Event. Something that happens, e.g., the deflection of a pointer needle or the click of a detector; a change. Quantum mechanics presupposes actual events or states of affairs but does not account for their occurrence or existence. The occurrence of an actual event is unpredictable. However, if one of a complete set of mutually contradictory events does occur, the identity of this event may be predictable on the basis of past actual events and/or states of affairs. If it is, then it is consistent with all facts to "switch" to the classical mode of thinking (that is, to ignore the antecedent and think of the actually occurring event as causally determined by past actual events and/or states of affairs).
Extrinsic property. A contingent property of S that is undefined, and hence not attributable to S, unless its being possessed by S can be inferred from what happens or is the case in the rest of the world W −S. If p is an extrinsic property, the proposition p = "S is p" is meaningless just in case neither its truth nor its falsity can be inferred from the goings-on in W − S. Indefinite. The value of an observable A (with a specific range of possible values a i ) is said to be indefinite is there isn't any matter of fact from which the actually possessed value can be inferred (that is, if none of the values a i is actually possessed).
Instantaneous state. The state of a system at an exact time, usually supposed to be evolving in time and to represent not only actually possessed properties but also everything of the past that remains causally relevant to the future (this is then thought of as a field with properties of its own).
Intrinsic property. A property p of S for which the proposition p = "S is p" is "of itself" (that is, unconditionally) either true or false at any time; neither the truth nor the meaning of p depends on the goings-on in the rest of the world W − S.
Local action (or local causality). The notion that local matters of fact at a space-time point P are influenced only by local matters of fact in the infinitesimal neighborhood of P.
Macroscopic object. An object M that satisfies the following criterion: any factually warranted inference about the position of M at any time t is predictable (with certainty) on the basis of factually warranted inferences about the positions of M at earlier times.
Manifestly indefinite. Saying that the value of an observable A on a system S is manifestly indefinite is the same as saying that some of the factually warranted values of A differ from the values predicted via the pertinent classical dynamical laws on the basis of all relevant factually warranted inferences about the properties of S at earlier times.
(Matter of ) fact. An actual event or an actual state of affairs.
Measurement. The occurrence of an actual event, or the coming into existence of an actual state of affairs, that warrants attributing some property to a physical system. Measurement result. A matter of fact about the possessed properties of a physical system S; an actual state of affairs from which the possession by S of some property can be inferred; a property the possession of which is factually warranted.
Objective probability. A probability assigned to a counterfactual (or to a possible result of a not actually performed measurement) on the basis of a complete set of relevant facts. Objective probabilities have nothing to do with ignorance -there is nothing to be ignorant of.
PIQM. The Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics; the complex of ideas put forth in this article.
Preparation. The second-worst word in the vocabulary of quantum mechanics. It suggests that a measurement prepares an evolving actual state of affairs. In reality all that is "prepared" by a measurement is a set of probability assignments.
Retrocausation. Backward-in-time causation. Retroparation, retropare. The time-reverse of "preparation" and "prepare." Separability. The fallacious notion that the distinctions inherent in the set-theoretic conceptions of space and time are intrinsic to (real, physical) space and time.
State. The worst word in the vocabulary of quantum mechanics. Legitimately, a state is a collection of actually possessed properties. A quantum state (the state vector or the density operator) is such a collection only at the time at which it is "prepared." At other times, it encapsulates (Born) probability assignments to conditionals.
State of affairs. A possibility or an actuality that can be stated as a propositions. An actual state of affairs is something that is actually the case, e.g., the needle's pointing left. Quantum mechanics presupposes actual events or states of affairs but does not account for their occurrence or existence. The existence of an actual state of affairs is unpredictable. However, if one of a complete set of mutually contradictory states of affairs does obtain, the identity of this state of affairs may be predictable on the basis of past actual events and/or states of affairs. If it is, then it is consistent with all facts to "switch" to the classical mode of thinking (that is, we can ignore the antecedent and think of the actually existing state of affairs as causally determined by past actual events and/or states of affairs).
Subjective probability. A probability assigned on the basis of an incomplete set of relevant facts. If a measurement is actually performed, the probabilities associated with the possible results are based on an incomplete set of facts; they take no account of the actual result; they therefore express our (subjective) ignorance of the actual result.
Synchronic correlations. Correlations between the results of local measurements performed on different systems in spacelike separation.
Two-state. A pair of states representing the respective results of complete measurements performed at two times between which no further measurement is made. It determines the objective ABL probabilities associated with the possible results of measurements that could have been, but were not, performed in the meantime.
61. Eyvind H. Wichmann (Quantum Physics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, p. 57fn) is closer to the truth when he comments on the so-called coupling of electrons to the electromagnetic field: "It would... be more profound to say that the coupling constant tells us how strongly elementary charges interact with each other. The electromagnetic field is, after all, a mental construct introduced for the purpose of discussing interactions between charges" (original italics).
